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RIGHTS OF INDIVIDUAL WORKERS IN UNION-
MANAGEMENT ARBITRATION
PROCEEDINGS*
THE individual worker can, in most instances, rely on the union to adminis-
ter a collective bargaining contract to his best interest. Occasionally, however,
conflicts between the union and individual may prevent the latter from receiv-
ing adequate representation.1 For example, in promoting the seniority claim of
one worker, the union must reject the competing claim of another employee.2
While the worker not supported by the union may present his claim directly
to the employer,3 the nearly universal rule is that he cannot invoke the arbi-
tration machinery established by the collective agreement for the settlement of
disputes. 4 But what remedies are available to an employee when the union and
employer have begun an arbitration affecting his interest is at present an un-
resolved question.
Employees may not be adequately represented at a union-management arbi-
tration in several situations. Sometimes the interests of some employees are
aligned with the employer rather than the union.5 For example, union and
*In the Matter of Iroquois Beverage Corp., 159 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
1. See, Report of Committee on Improvement of Administration of Union-Man-
agement Agreements, 1954--Individual Grievances, 50 Nw. U.L. REv. 143, 153 (1955)
(hereinafter cited as Report on Individual Grievances).
2. E.g., Cuff v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 134 N.Y.L.J. No. 70, p. 6, col. 7 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 1955). Cf. Cox, Rights Under a Labor Agreement, 69 HARv. L. R-v.
601, 604 (1956). Similarly, in negotiating contracts, the union must often choose between
competing claims of workers for seniority rights. The employees whose seniority rights
are subordinated by the contract have sometimes sought redress in the courts. See, e.g.,
Britt v. Trailmobile, 179 F.2d 569 (6th Cir. 1950) ; Hartley v. Brotherhood of Railway &
S.S. Clerks, 283 Mich. 201, 277 N.W. 885 (1938); Belanger v. Local 1128, Ass'n Street
Employees, 254 Wis. 344, 36 N.W.2d 414 (1949), supplementary relief denied, 256 Wis.
479, 41 N.W.2d 607 (1950).
3. In industries engaged in interstate commerce, direct access to the employer is guar-
anteed: ". . . any individual employee or group of employees shall have the right at any
time to present grievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative.. . ." Labor Management Relations Act
(Taft-Hartley Act) § 9(a), 61 STAT. 143 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1952). For dis-
cussion of the history and possible interpretations of this clause, see Cox, supra note 2,
at 622-24; Report on Individual Grievances, supra note 1, at 169-79 (1955).
4. Terrell v. Machinists Ass'n, 26 Lab. Arb. 579 (Calif. Dist. App. 1956) (dictum);
Cox v. R. H. Macy & Co., 152 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ; In re Wright, 130 N.Y.L.J.
1516, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Dec. 21, 1953); Sholgen v. Lipsett, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 165
(Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Parker v. Borock, 136 N.Y.S.2d 588 (Sup. Ct. 1954), aff'd, 286 App.
Div. 851, 141 N.Y.S.2d 359 (2d Dep't 1955) (dictum). Contra, In the Matter of House-
hold Fuel Corp., 131 N.Y.L.J. No. 5, p. 12, col. 1 (Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 1954) (agency theory)
(dictum) ; see also Cox, supra note 2, at 650 n.140 (collecting other cases) ; Report on
Individual Grievances, supra note 1, at 160 n.71 (same).
5. E.g., Dillon v. American Brass Co., 10 Lab. Arb. 930 (Conn. 1948) (employer
contracted to deduct union dues from pay of union members; arbitrating his refusal to
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management may arbitrate a dispute over the meaning of the union shop pro-
vision of a collective agreement.6 In arguing that the union shop provision
covers only subsequently hired employees and that non-union employees are
thus entitled to hold their jobs, the employer represents the non-union em-
ployees' interests as well as his own. Nonetheless, separate representation of
these employees may be necessary for effective protection of their interests. In
a second type of situation, the union may purport to represent an employee,
but not do so in good faith.7 For example, the union may not agree with an
employee's view of a dispute, but rather than risk a charge of betrayal by
rejecting the worker's claim, the union may submit the grievance to the arbi-
trator. Although the union may then offer only token representation of the
worker's case, and indeed may even make its indifference known to the arbi-
trator,8 responsibility for a decision against the worker will rest on the arbi-
trator.0 In such situations the employee must present his own case, not merely
to secure more effective representation but to obtain any representation at all.
The individual employee's need for separate representation is most urgent,
however, when his interest is opposed by both sides.10 For example, three
employees may claim the same job by interpreting the seniority provision of
a contract in three different ways. If the union supports one interpretation
while the employer favors another, the claim of the third employee will not
even be presented to the arbitrator. Yet the arbitration will award the very
job that he seeks.
In these settings, individual employees have resorted to three different pro-
cedures to protect their interests. They have sought from courts and arbi-
deduct dues from the pay of some workers, employer advanced their claim that they were
not union members) ; In re Truscon Steel Co., 1. Lab. Arb. 196 (NWLB 1946) (employer
defends refusal to deduct dues from salaries on ground that employees were coerced or
intimidated into union membership during fifteen-day escape period) ; Weisler v. Burns,
303 N.Y. 657, 101 N.E.2d 764 (1951) (after signing a union shop contract, employer
moved plant, offering all employees job in the new location; eventually all union employees
quit; when .ntire working force consisted of non-union employees, union demanded that
all non-union employees be fired under the union shop provision). See also Nord v. Grif-
fin, 86 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 673 (1937) (seniority dispute) ; In
the Matter of I. Miller & Sons, 195 Misc. 20, 88 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup. Ct. 1949).
6. E.g., Weisler v. Burns, supra note 5; In the Matter of I. Miller & Sons, supra note 5.
7. See, e.g., Report on Indizidual Grievances, supra note 1, at 155.
8. See ibid:
".... In one discharge case the union officers made only the motions of protesting,
apparently because the individual had criticized the laxity of union officers. The
union even informed the arbitrator prior to the hearing that they 'wouldn't mind
if they lost this one.'"
9. See, e.g., Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L.
REv. 999, 1016,1024 (1955).
10. Cf. In the Matter of Iroquois Beverage Corp., 159 N.Y.S2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955).
Union and management submitted to arbitration a dispute over seniority rights. Since both
sides opposed the intervention of certain individual employees, it is likely that both opposed
the seniority claims of the intervenors.
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trators the right to intervene in arbitration proceedings." Or, they have at-
tempted to stay the proceedings 12 -a procedure which would prevent union
and management from utilizing arbitration to settle their disputes. And, after
the arbitration has ended, they have sought to upset the award by either at-
tempting to enjoin its enforcement,13 challenging a motion to confirm it,14 or
bringing suit to vacate judgment on the award. 15 All of these procedures,
however, have faced the same doctrinal objections. The foundation of an arbi-
tration proceeding is contract. Since the union and employer are the only
parties to the arbitration contract, individual employees cannot claim any
rights thereunder. 16 Moreover, because they are strangers to the arbitration
11. E.g., Weisler v. Burns, 278 App. Div. 906, 105 N.Y.S.2d 615 (1st Dep't), aff'd
on other grounds, 303 N.Y. 657, 101 N.E.2d 764 (1951) ; In the Matter of Iroquois Bever-
age Corp., supra note 10; Darrell v. Neushaefer, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1954). Cf. Golden Eagle Life Ins. Corp., 16 Lab. Arb. 103 (N.Y. arbitration 1951) (rival
union seeking to intervene) ; Flora Fashions v. Commerce Realty Corp., 80 N.Y.S.2d 384,
387 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (intervention in commercial arbitration).
12. Cuff v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 134 N.Y.L.J. No. 70, p. 6, col. 7 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct Oct. 10, 1955) (stay denied); Barker v. Barile, 25 L.R.RM. 2527 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1950) (stay granted) ; In the Matter of I. Miller & Sons, 195 Misc. 20, 88 N.Y.S.2d 573
(Sup. Ct. 1949) (stay denied).
13. Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 673 (1937)
(Railway Labor Act, injunction granted) ; Dillon v. American Brass Co., 10 Lab. Arb.
930 (Conn. 1948) (injunction denied); Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App.
Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709 (3d Dep't 1954), aff'd mere., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227
(1954) (injunction denied) ; Darrell v. Neushaefer, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1954) (same) ; Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 170 Misc. 482, 10
N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sup. Ct. 1939) (injunction conditionally granted). Cf. Romanoff v. Nilow
Realty Corp., 273 App. Div. 788, 75 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2d Dep't 1947) (rental arbitration,
injunction denied).
14. In the Matter of Carolyn Laundry, 129 N.Y.L.J. 2035, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
17, 1953) (motion to confirm denied); Cuff v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 134 N.Y.L.J. No.
70, p. 6, col. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 1955) (dictum) ; Curtis v. New York World-Telegram
Corp., 282 App. Div. 183, 121 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1953) (dictum). Cf. Dumas v.
Upland Builders, Inc., 16 Lab. Arb. 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951) (unsuccessful attempt by
new union, not a party to contract, to challenge old union's motion to confirm an arbi-
tration award) ; Publishers' Ass'n v. New York Typographical Union, 168 Misc. 267, 270,
5 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850 (Sup. Ct. 1938) (employers' association party to contract and the
arbitration; individual employer, real party in interest, attempted unsuccessfully to chal-
lenge union's motion to confine the award) ; In re Spottswood, 88 N.Y.S.2d 572 (Sup. Ct.
1945) (third party claimant of goods stored in warehouse denied standing to challenge
motion).
15. See Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709
(3d Dep't), aff'd inem., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227 (1954) ; Curtis v. New York
World-Telegram Corp., stepra note 14. Cf. Romanoff v. Nilow Realty Corp., 273 App.
Div. 788, 75 N.Y.S.2d 266 (2d Dep't 1947).
16. Right to intervene denied: Weisler v. Burns, 278 App. Div. 906, 105 N.Y.S.2d 615
(1st Dep't), aff'd on other grounds, 303 N.Y. 657, 101 N.E.2d 764 (1951) ; Darrell v.
Neushaefer, Inc., 22 Lab. Arb. 240 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1954) ; Golden Eagle Life Ins. Co., 16
Lab. Arb. 103 (N.Y. arbitration 1951). Contra, In the Matter of Iroquois Beverage Corp.,
159 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955) ; Donato v. American Locomotive Co., supra note 15.
Right to stay proceedings denied: see cases cited note 12 supra.
Right to attack the award denied: Dillon v. American Brass Co., 10 Lab. Arb. 930
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contract, the individual employees are not legally bound by the decision of the
arbitrator,17 and do not theoretically need protection against the proceedings.
While most courts have found these doctrinal objections insurmountable,' s
some recent cases hold that third parties possess rights in arbitration proceed-
ings affecting their interest. A number of courts have refused to enforce arbi-
tration awards or have enjoined their enforcement by union and management
when individual employees adversely affected by the arbitration were not
given notice of the proceedings or not allowed to participate in them.19 Of
these cases, some have indicated merely that the arbitration award is unen-
forceable ;20 others have denied enforcement of the award only until the arbitra-
(Conn. 1948); Darrell v. Neushaefer, Inc., supra. Cf. Dumas v. Upland Builders, Inc.,
16 Lab. Arb. 588 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1951); Romanoff v. Nilow Realty Corp., 273 App. Div.
783, 75 N.Y.S.2d 666 (2d Dep't 1947) (rental arbitration) ; In re Spottswood, 88 N.Y.S.2d
572 (Sup. Ct. 1945). Contra, Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 170
Misc. 482, 10 N.Y.S.2d 519 (Sup. Ct. 1939) ; Donato v. American Locomotive Co., supra
at 413, 127 N.Y.S.2d at 713 (dictum) ; cf. Publishers' Ass'n v. New York Typographical
Union, 168 Misc. 267, 270, 5 N.Y.S.2d 847, 850 (Sup. Ct. 1938).
17. See, e.g., In the Matter of I. Miller & Sons, 195 Misc. 20, 88 N.Y.S.2d 573 (Sup.
Ct. 1949) ; 6 C.J.S., Arbitration & Award § 89(3) (1937). For the same conclusion in
commercial arbitration cases, see Romanoff v. Nilow Realty Corp., 273 App. Div. 788, 75
N.Y.S.2d 266 (2d Dep't 1947) ; Brescia Constr. Co. v. Walart Constr. Co., 238 App. Div.
45, 263 N.Y. Supp. 13 (1st Dep't 1933) (surety who participated in arbitration proceeding
but who was not a party to arbitration contract not bound by award) ; In the Matter of
Louis Michel, Inc., 238 App. Div. 480, 265 N.Y. Supp. 165 (1st Dep't 1933), rev'd on other
grounds, 264 N.Y. 23, 189 N.E. 767 (1934) (surety for owner not bound by arbitration be-
tween owner and contractor since surety was not a party to the arbitration contract);
STURGES, CommERcIAL ARBITRATION AND AwARDs § 307 (1930). Contra, Newspaper & Mail
Deliverers Union v. Newark Newsdealers Supply Co., 15 Lab. Arb. 697 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1950) (agency theory) ; Conneaut Lake Agricultural Ass'n v. Pittsburgh Surety Co., 225
Pa. 592, 74 A. 620 (1909) ; Hostetter v. Pittsburgh, 107 Pa. 419 (1884).
18. See cases cited note 16 supra.
19. In the Matter of Carolyn Laundry, 129 N.Y.L.J. 2035, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
17, 1953) (refusal to enforce award.) For cases under the Railway Labor Act, 44
STAT. 577 (1926), as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1952), see Dwellingham v. Thomp-
son, 91 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Mo. 1950), aff'd sub nom. Rolfes v. Dwellingham, 198 F.2d
591. (8th Cir. 1952) (enforcement of award enjoined) ; Brotherhood of Railroad Train-
men v. Templeton, 181 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1950) (same) ; Hunter v. Atchison T. & S.F.
Ry., 171 F.2d 594 (7th Cir. 1948) (same) ; Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1936),
cert. denied, 300 U.S. 673 (1937) (same) ; Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d 768, 770
(5th Cir. 1937) (dictum). See also Curtis v. New York World-Telegram Corp., 282 App.
Div. 183, 121 N.Y.S.2d 825 (1st Dep't 1953) (dictum); Cuff v. New York Shipping Ass'n,
134 N.Y.L.J. No. 70, p. 6, col. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 1955) (dictum).
In Dwellingham v. Thompson, supra, the court held that notice and participation of
third parties were required in National Railroad Adjustment Board arbitrations but not
in common law arbitrations. The court reasoned that the act allows one party to force the
other to arbitrate a dispute, but expressly provides that all parties to the controversy must
be given a "full and fair" hearing.
20. See, e.g., Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d
709 (3d Dep't 1954), aff'd mere., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227 (1954) ; Curtis v. New
York World-Telegram Corp., supra note 19; Cuff v. New York Shipping Ass'n, supra
note 19; Busch Jewelry Co. v. United Retail Employees' Union, 171 Misc. 482, 10 N.Y.S.2d
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tion was reopened to allow the individual employees to present their views.2 1 In
providing that the award may be so cured, courts have in effect given third
parties the right to participate in arbitration proceedings. In addition, some
courts have suggested in dictum that individual employees could petition courts
for an order requiring their participation in arbitration.2 2 A recent New York
Supreme Court decision, In the Matter of Iroquois Beverage Corp.,23 appar-
ently marks the first time that a court actually ordered the participation of
individual employees in an arbitration proceeding.
Though culminating a trend towards ordering participation, the Iroquois
case represents a far more significant inroad upon orthodox arbitration doc-
trine than the cases permitting an award to be challenged. Because the pro-
ceeding to enforce an arbitration award is judicial,2 4 the usual procedural rules
of intervention should give interested third parties standing to protest court
approval of the award.25 Moreover, courts commonly decline to enforce con-
tracts that offend public policy.26 Consistent with this principle, a court may
refuse to enforce an arbitration award rendered in a proceeding that was un-
fair to interested third parties. 27 But when parties have not turned to the
courts for the enforcement of their arbitration contract, these rationales cannot
justify ordering participation of third parties. For the order of participation
constitutes affirmative regulation of the terms of the contract. In Iroquois,
however, the court did not take note of this distinction between a refusal to
enforce an arbitration award and an order permitting participation. And the
519 (Sup. Ct. 1939). For cases arising under the Railway Labor Act, 44 STAT. 577 (1926),
as amended, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1952), see Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Temple-
ton, 181 F.2d 527 (8th Cir. 1950) ; Hunter v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 171 F.2d 594 (7th
Cir. 1948) ; Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 673 (1937).
21. Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937); In the Matter of
Carolyn Laundry, 129 N.Y.L.J. 2035, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June 17, 1953).
22. Donato v. American Locomotive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709, (3d
Dep't), aff'd meem., 306 N.Y. 966, 120 N.E.2d 227 (1954) ; Cuff v. New York Shipping
Ass'n, 134 N.Y.L.J. No. 70, p. 6, col. 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 1955) ; In the Matter of
Carolyn Laundry, supra note 21.
23. 159 N.Y.S.2d 256 (Sup. Ct. 1955). The court ordered participation even over the
objection of the union and the employer.
24. See, e.g., N.Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT §§ 1459, 1461, 1462, 1462-a.
25. E.g., FED. R. Civ. P. 24; CLARK, CODE PLEADING § 65 (1947) (collecting statutes
and cases).
26. See, e.g., Gatliff Coal Co. v. Cox, 142 F.2d 876 (6th Cir. 1944) (arbitration con-
tract held contrary to public policy and thus unenforceable). See, generally, 6 CoRaiN,
CoNTAcrs §§ 1373-78 (1951.).
27. In the Matter of Carolyn Laundry, 129 N.Y.L.J. 2035, col. 5 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. June
17, 1953); Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937) (Railway Labor
Act). See also Nord v. Griffin, 86 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1936) (enforcement of an arbitration
award from an unfair proceeding under Railway Labor Act would be denial of due process).
While some courts have gone further and enjoined voluntary enforcement, note 19
supra, they have relied upon the provision of the Railway Labor Act giving a fair hearing
to parties to the controversy. See Dwellingham v. Thompson, 91 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Mo.
1950), aff'd sub m. Rolfes v. Dwellingham, 198 F.2d 591 (8th Cir. 1952).
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court largely ignored standard arbitration doctrine.2 8 In effecting this signifi-
cant enlargement of third-party rights in arbitration, the judge relied prin-
cipally on his view that the parties to the arbitration contract would not be
prejudiced by the participation of the employees.29
The indifference displayed in Iroquois to traditional strictures against third-
party rights in arbitration is, however, proper. Although such rights could be
derived from agency 30 or third-party beneficiary 31 doctrines, labor-manage-
ment relations pose special problems that should be resolved with a view to
the needs of contemporary labor policy.32 In short, whether employees are
entitled to protection in union-management arbitration, and whether partici-
pation, a stay or an attack upon the award is the proper remedy should be
viewed as questions of labor policy. Like the cases adhering to traditional
arbitration doctrine, however, Iroquois and the decisions permitting attacks
upon awards have not adequately considered the questions in this context.
In a labor setting the view that strangers to the arbitration contract are not
bound by an award is a fiction which can only serve to obscure the need for
protecting employees. Although not bound in law by the decision of the arbi-
trator,33 employees are bound in fact. For example, an arbitration that awards
seniority rights, and thus job security or promotion to one employee, effec-
tively disposes of the competing claims of other employees.3 4 Usually the em-
ployee's contract with his employer is a contract at will, so that the
aggrieved employee has no right to damages for loss of employment.3 5 And
28. The court does mention that workers have been considered third party beneficiaries
of labor contracts though not specifically of labor arbitration contracts. 159 N.Y.S.2d at
257. The opinion quotes a discussion of arbitration doctrine in Donato v. American Loco-
motive Co., 283 App. Div. 410, 127 N.Y.S.2d 709 (3d Dep't), aff'd iner., 306 N.Y. 966,
120 N.E.2d 227 (1954). Yet scant effort is made to apply or distinguish standard prin-
ciples in connection with the facts at hand.
29. 159 N.Y.S.2d at 259.
30. See In the 'Matter of Household Fuel Corp., 131 N.Y.L.J. No. 5, p. 12, col. 1 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Jan. 8, 1954) (dictum). Contra, In re New York Times Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 31, 152
N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st Dep't 1956). Agency doctrine has been used to give individual em-
ployees rights under a collective bargaining contract. See Cox, supra note 2, at 646; 66
YALE L.J. 449, 455 n.24 (1957) (collecting cases).
31. See Curti v. Union Engineering Corp., 12 Lab. Arb. 292 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1949),
aff'd, 304 N.Y. 761, 108 N.E.2d 676 (1952). For use of third-party beneficiary doctrine
to grant individual employees other rights under a collective bargaining contract, see Cox,
supra note 2, at 646 (collecting cases) ; 66 YALE L.J. 449, 454 n.23 (1957) (same).
32. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 2, at 603-05; Shulman, supra note 9; Comment, 66 YALE
L.J. 223,241 (1956).
33. Only parties to the arbitration contract are legally bound by the arbitration award.
See note 17 supra.
34. E.g., Estes v. Union Terminal Co., 89 F.2d 768 (5th Cir. 1937) ; Nord v. Griffin,
86 F.2d 481 (7th Cir. 1936), cert. denied, 300 U.S. 673 (1937) ; Dwellingham v. Thomp-
son, 91 F. Supp. 787 (E.D. Mo. 1950), aff'd srb norn., Rolfes v. Dwellingham, 198 F.2d
591 (8th Cir. 1952) ; Cuff v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 134 N.Y.L.J. No. 70, p. 6, col. 7
(N.Y. Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 1955). Cf. Weisler v. Burns, 278 App. Div. 906, 105 N.Y.S.2d
615 (1st Dep't 1951), aff'd on other grounds, 303 N.Y. 657, 101 N.E.2d 764 (1951).
35. See, e.g., Dwellingham v. Thompson, stpra note 34, at 794.
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even if the collective agreement grants seniority rights to the employee, he
probably will have no independent means of enforcing them. Since an arbi-
tration clause is generally held to provide the exclusive mode for settling con-
tract disputes, the employee may not resort to the courts for the enforcement
of his rights.36 And a body of law, developed to meet the need for stability
in labor relations, precludes the employee from initiating arbitration on his
claim.3 7 Thus the employee whose job was awarded to another by an arbitra-
tion at which he was not present is without means of redress. The individual
employee should not be so foreclosed unless some compelling policy demands
this sacrifice.38
Recognizing, in arbitration, individual employees' rights apart from their
union, however, may jeopardize the stability of labor relations. Industrial
stability is enhanced by allowing a union to speak authoritatively for all em-
ployees during both contract negotiations and subsequent administration of the
agreement. 9 If individual workers were allowed to bargain separately with
the employer, the ability of the union to reach a collective agreement for all
employees would be impaired. 40 A similar rationale has been employed in for-
bidding individual employees to initiate arbitration.41 The success of a col-
lective agreement in stabilizing relations depends on the ability of the parties
to settle most of their disputes amicably without resort to arbitration.42 Ex-
clusive control over initiating arbitration enables the union and the employer
to agree to settlements that cannot be attacked by dissatisfied employees. 43 In
addition, exclusive control allows the union to filter employee grievances, and
36. See Cox, supra note 3, at 648 n.133, 649 n.138 (collecting cases).
37. See note 4 supra and accompanying text.
38. The Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 expresses a policy of permitting
wide freedom of choice and action for individual employees while at the same time encour-
aging collective bargaining to maintain industrial stability. Taft-Hartley Act § 1; 61
STAT. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 141 (1952). In furtherance of this policy, § 9(a) gives in-
dividual employees the right to present grievances directly to their employer. See note 3
supra; Report on Individual Grievances, supra note 1, at 143.
39. See, e.g., In re New York Times Co., 2 App. Div. 2d 31, 152 N.Y.S.2d 884 (1st
Dep't 1956) ; Cox v. R. H. Macy & Co., 152 N.Y.S.2d 858 (Sup. Ct. 1956) ; Sholgen v.
Lipsett, Inc., 116 N.Y.S.2d 165 (Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Cox, supra note 3, at 621-23, 631; Dunau,
Employee Participation in the Grievance Aspect of Collective Bargaining, 50 COLUm. L.
Ray. 731, 734-35 (1950).
40. See, e.g., Medo Photo Supply Corp. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 678 (1944) ; J. I. Case
Co. v. NLRB, 321 U.S. 332 (1944).
41. See cases cited note 4 supra; Cox, supra note 3, at 626-27.
42. See, e.g., Shulman, The Role of the Impartial Umpire, in BAKKE & KaRn, UNIONS,
MANAGETMENT, AND THE PuBLIc 485, 486 (1948); SHULMAN, OPINIONS OF THE UPnE
preface (1946).
43. If the individual is not allowed to initiate arbitration, see note 4 supra, and if the
arbitration clause of the collective contract bars him from bringing suit, see text at note
36 supra, then the employee will have no way to challenge any settlemenL made by the
union and employer. But see Elgin, J. & E. Ry. v. Burley, 325 U.S. 711 (1945). For dis-




thus minimize disputes by eliminating claims of no merit without harassing
the employer.44
However, the right to intervene in pending arbitration proceedings will not
disturb the stability of industrial relations. Once arbitration is initiated, the
employer's attention is necessarily drawn to the dispute, and thus no oppor-
tunity remains for the union to eliminate frivolous claims. Moreover, a dispute
reaches arbitration only when the parties have failed to achieve a voluntary
settlement. Thus, the function of the arbitration procedure should be to facili-
tate a satisfactory decision by the arbitrator rather than to provide conditions
conducive to settlements by the parties.45 Recognition of the right of individ-
ual employees to intervene will usually be consistent with this goal. Since par-
ticipation of employees may evoke facts that might not otherwise emerge, the
arbitrator's ability to render a just and well-considered decision is enhanced.4 6
However, when intervening employees present claims which neither employer
nor union has advanced,47 it may be argued that intervention is tantamount to
the initiation of proceedings. This argument, even if correct, should not bar
intervention, for individuals are precluded from initiating arbitration to allow
the union to select the disputes that are important enough to reach arbitra-
tion.48 But this reasoning clearly does not apply when arbitration has already
been initiated by the union.
Some modification of the Iroquois ruling may be desirable. Individual em-
ployees may attempt to intervene merely to harass the union and the employer.
And under certain circumstances, the intervention of individual employees
may unduly complicate a dispute. For these reasons, courts should give the
arbitrator discretion to forbid frivolous intervention and should upset his
decision only when it is shown to be clearly unreasonable. judicial recognition
of a right to intervene, even so qualified, would be a meaningful revision of
traditional law. For arbitrators who under orthodox law feel powerless to
allow participation by employees 49 would gain freedom to do so. And em-
ployees, now unprotected during an arbitration, would be safeguarded from
arbitrary exclusion.
While courts should follow Iroquois and permit employees to participate in
pending arbitration proceedings, they should not allow workers to stay arbi-
tration permanently. To implement the right of participation, courts could
delay enforcement of an award until employees are allowed to participate. 50
Some courts, however, have suggested that employees could stay arbitration
44. See, e.g., LABOR RELATIONS AND THE LAW 427 (Mathews ed. 1953).
45. See, e.g., 4 BNA LABOR POLICY AND PRACnCE 253:401 (1950).
46. Arbitrators have emphasized the need for widest investigation of the facts. See,
e.g., Shulman, Reason, Contract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARv. L. REV. 999, 1017
(1955).
47. See example cited in text following note 10 supra.
48. See note 44 supra.
49. See, e.g., Cox, supra note 3, at 629-30.
50. For cases following this procedure, see note 21 supra.
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indefinitely.5 1 If the union and management are then unable to reach agree-
ment, a permanent stay of arbitration would force their disputes into court-
by and large an unsuitable forum for the settlement of labor controversies. 2
Therefore, union and management should be encouraged to establish their own
extra-judicial system for resolving disputes; and individual employees should
not be permitted to frustrate their expectations, especially since participation
in arbitration would just as adequately protect the interests of individuals. Of
course intervening employees will have had no part in choosing the arbitra-
tor.53 But they are safeguarded from abuse by the right to challenge the arbi-
tration award if the arbitrator was biased or the procedure unfair.5 4
The protection that Iroquois promises individual employees, however, should
not be over-emphasized. Even if this right to participate is accepted, unions
will still have absolute discretion to initiate arbitration proceedings. Aware
that a rival faction will be able to prosecute an employee's claim once arbitra-
tion is begun, unions may be willing to sacrifice workers' interests rather than
initiate proceedings. And an employer may be tempted to yield to a claim sup-
ported by the union rather than enter into an arbitration at which an even
more unfavorable rival claim may be presented by an individual employee.
Thus individual employees may never have the chance to protect their interests
after all. But because voluntary settlement of disputes without resort to out-
side arbitrators achieves greater industrial stability, this curtailment of in-
dividual remedies seems, on balance, to be warranted. Moreover, the individual
is not totally without recourse. If the individual's rights have been flagrantly
disregarded by the union, it may be charged with a breach of duty.55 And in
less extreme cases, the loss of prestige resulting from unfavorable concessions
will often deter settlements motivated purely by union self-interest. 6
51. See, e.g., Cuff v. New York Shipping Ass'n, 134 N.Y.L.J. No. 70, p. 6, col. 7 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. Oct. 10, 1955).
52. For discussion of the inadequacy of courts in this area, see, e.g., SHULMAN &
CHAMBERLAIN, CASES ON LABOR RELATIoNS 4-6 (1949). See also Shulman, Reason, Con-
tract, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. REv. 999, 1024 (1955) ; Summers, Judicial
Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through the Looking Glass, 3 BuFrALo L. REv. 1,
22-24 (1953).
53. The parties to the arbitration contract-the union and the employer-select the
arbitrator. The individual employee, as a third party, would be excluded from participat-
ing in the selection. One commentator has suggested that individual non-union employees
should pay for the expenses of their arbitration. See Cox, supra note 2, at 652. But se
Hughes Tool Co., 104 N.L.R.B. 318 (1953).
54. 6 C.J.S., Arbitration & Award § 104(c) (1937).
55. See Report on Individual Grievances, supra note 1, at 161-62.
56. See id. at 155-56.
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